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The Contingent Valuation Method: Retrospect and Prospect 
Clive L. Spash1 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the contingent valuation method for environmental valuation.  
Issues are raised over the validity of the approach as a method of assessing the 
underlying preferences of individuals.  An alternative interpretation is given to the 
method as a means of exploring underlying motivation in a rich vein of social 
psychological research. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The contingent valuation method (CVM) is a controversial approach by which 
economists have attempted to place a value upon environmental changes.  The basic 
method involves a questionnaire which asks a respondent their willingness to pay 
(WTP) for an environmental improvement or their willingness to accept (WTA) 
compensation for a loss or degradation of environmental assets or quality.  The 
resulting stated preference is most commonly used as a mean value of the change 
and then aggregated across the relevant population and discounted for time.  The 
original justification was the need to include the resulting monetary value as part of a 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) to aid project appraisal.  The theoretical basis for such an 
approach relies upon micro-economic welfare theory where individual’s maximise 
their utility subject to an income constraint, or minimise their expenditure subject to a 
utility constraint (see Hanley and Spash, 1993). 
The CVM has proven the most popular of the available methods for monetary 
valuation of the environment.  There are three main reasons.  First, the technique has 
the air of simplicity, and indeed early surveys contained very little beyond a direct 
question on WTP or WTA and a few socioeconomic details.  Second, the range of 
applications has seemed unlimited because such questions could apparently be 
asked concerning provision of any environmental “good or service”.  A related point is 
that the CVM provided freedom from being restricted by available economic data 
which had limited all previous approaches to secondary data.  Third, the range of 
“economic values” was expanded to categories previously outside the economists 
grasp so that the CVM introduced measurement of option, existence and bequest 
values.  These new categories have been termed passive or indirect use values - the 
term “non-use” is misleading as preference utilitarianism means all economic values 
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are based upon utility or usefulness to an individual.  However, all three supposed 
advantages have proven controversial.  Critiques of the first and third advantages 
have involved psychological perspectives, including concerns that preferences are 
labile and constructed with susceptibility to framing effects and variations in context 
and elicitation procedures rather than stable, complete and transitive (Fischhoff, 1991; 
Kahneman et al., 1993; Schkade and Payne, 1994). 
Vatn (2004) has identified two camps amongst economists concerning 
environmental valuation.  First are those who regard all anomalies as ‘measurement 
bias’ to be removed by careful design and data censoring.  Second are those who 
dismiss the whole valuation exercise, and CVM in particular, due to inconsistency 
with neoclassical theory.  This paper explores the development of these positions 
while focussing upon the specific role psychology has and can play in aiding the 
debate.  In doing so the argument is developed that understanding the motives 
behind responses to CVM surveys is important for improving choice theory.  This is in 
accord with what Vatn (2004) has termed a third way where neither of the existing 
alternative camps hold sway. 
In the next section a brief review is conducted of how the CVM interacted with 
psychology while moving from an experimental technique to a high profile 
internationally recognised method of environmental valuation.  This leads to a 
discussion of the extensive attempts which have been made to address controversy 
via dictating survey design.  The topic of bias is introduced and the specific areas 
covered include strategic behaviour, hypothetical bias, WTP vs WTA, and information 
bias.  The findings suggest the need for work on individual motivation for survey 
responses.  Ethical beliefs are noted as an often neglected aspect of motivation for 
CVM responses, but shown to be important factors on the basis of existing empirical 
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results.  The paper closes by drawing some conclusions on future research directions 
and on the use of the CVM in decision making processes. 
CVM DEVELOPMENT AND THE PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 
CVM developed in the United States especially amongst researchers at the 
University of Wyoming in the late 1970s and early to mid 1980s eg. Ralph d’Arge, 
David Brookshire, Bill Schulze, Betsy Hoffman.  There was an early interest in 
behavioural theories associated with this work and explorations of experimental 
economics using student subjects.  Hanemann (1994: 21) has claimed the link with 
psychology took place at a workshop conducted to review the CVM which was 
summarised by Cummings, Brookshire and Schulze (1986), hereafter CBS.  However, 
there was already awareness within this North American environmental economics 
community of a range of psychological ideas, and the CBS volume was merely the 
first time this became more readily apparent.  Indeed, the connection had been made 
decades earlier by Ciriacy-Wantrup of whom d’Arge had been a student. 
As an early advocate of “interrogating” social groups as to their WTP for 
collective extra-market (i.e. public) goods, Ciriacy-Wantrup argued that: 
“Interrogating and voting can be used for quantitative determination as well as 
for ranking of values.  Considerable progress has been made recently in 
designing and evaluating group interrogations by questionnaire and interview.  
Economists, so far, have made little use of this progress in the field of individual 
and social psychology.  Welfare economics could be put on a more realistic 
foundation if a closer cooperation between economics and certain branches of 
applied psychology could be established” (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1947: 1190). 
Yet, despite this early signpost, various attempts at establishing more formal links 
with social psychology and behavioural theories have proven far from easy.  
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Participants at the CBS workshop who were advocating the use of attitude-behaviour 
models from social psychology were extremely critical of their reception:  “We 
certainly underestimated the barriers to interdisciplinary communication.  Our 
proposal that economists consider the attitudes-behaviour literature has met with 
indifference or hostility.  CBS are no exception” (Bishop and Heberlein, 1986: 141). 
Another attendee at the CBS workshop was the psychologist 
Daniel Kahnemann whose work has shown many of the flaws in economic models of 
human behaviour with the risk related research earning him a Nobel Prize in 
economics.  However his CVM research with Jack Knetsch (a pioneer of travel cost 
and hedonic pricing) provoked strong and defensive reactions, especially the paper 
on embedding (Kahneman and Knetsch, 1992).  Kahneman and Knetsch (1992) 
describe WTP under the CVM as the purchase of moral satisfaction rather than an 
exchange value.  This has been linked to a contribution model claiming that, while 
economists interpret WTP as purchasing a public good, respondents are stating 
charitable contributions reflecting their attitudinal concerns.  Kahneman et al. (1993: 
314) then argue that, if the only objective of measurement is to rank-order issues, 
WTP is “not the preferred way of doing so because it is psychometrically inferior to 
other measures of the same attitude.” 
Critical work on the CVM funded by Exxon Corporation also employed 
psychological approaches (Hausman, 1993).  Exxon was concerned by the use of the 
CVM as legal evidence indicating multi-billion dollar environmental damages arising 
from the Exxon Valdez tanker oil spill in Alaska.  In particular psychologists Schkade 
and Payne (1993; 1994) cited cognitive and decision making theories to establish 
their case for the use of verbal protocol analysis.  They found that CVM responses 
were consistent with the construction of preferences, and reflected moral satisfaction 
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and symbolic values.  Hanemann blamed the results upon the open-ended format 
employed and argued for the need to “work on the instrument until you get a tighter 
response” (see Hausman, 1993: 297-299).  Indeed a standard response of CVM 
experts is to argue for improvement in the techniques employed rather than to 
question the underlying theory. 
Following such reasoning, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) hired a group of experts to produce a report on the CVM 
which amounted to a list of guidelines.  The CBS workshop had produce shorter and 
more general guidelines.  The approach of the NOAA Panel included such extensive 
recommendations that no survey was ever likely to meet them all and still remain 
within the bounds of what the general public might be expected to reasonably 
respond to (a typical CVM interview lasts about 20 minutes).  The increased technical 
complexity, in-house interviews, larger samples required for the recommended 
dichotomous choice model, along with attempts to achieve the elusive goal of perfect 
random sampling, all added to expense for CVM surveys.  The surveys done for the 
Exxon Valdez case are cited as costing several million dollars by aiming for random 
sampling; these might have been conducted at a fraction of the cost by using 
convenience samples to create behavioural models for prediction of population 
responses on the basis of average population information (Harrison and Lesley, 
1996). 
The technique had moved in a decade from an obscure experimental 
approach to a high profile legally endorsed policy tool.  Throughout the 1970s CVM 
studies had remained US based and largely of academic interest.  In the 1980s and 
1990s studies took place first in Europe and then less developed economies, and 
became increasingly connected to government decision processes.  This fitted well 
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with pro market governments in Europe and the USA.  In the USA cost-benefit 
analysis returned to the public policy arena with President Reagan’s Executive Order 
12291 in 1981, and five years later the CVM was incorporated into regulations for 
measuring the damages associated with oil spills and hazardous wastes (Department 
of the Interior, 1986).  US Superfund legislation, aimed at hazardous waste site 
clean-up, then also involved cases where the CVM was employed.  In the UK the 
Government’s emphasis on monetary valuation increased and by 1988 the 
Department of the Environment was sponsoring work by environmental economists 
and soon recommending the use of CVM for both project and policy appraisal 
(Department of the Environment, 1991).  A further boost to the general ease of 
applying CVM surveys was given by Mitchell and Carson (1989) who provided a 
widely used manual for those wishing to avoid various pitfalls.  A bibliography in 1994 
listed almost one thousand CVM studies and papers world-wide (Carson et al., 1994).  
The Exxon case which led to the NOAA Panel report merely provided further 
endorsement for advocates because two Nobel Laureates could now be cited 
amongst those approving the CVM.  Of course the proviso was that the method be 
conducted in very specific ways in order to address all the problems which had 
become apparent. 
REFINING SURVEY DESIGN 
Many studies under the CVM, and especially earlier studies, were conducted for 
research purposes using small, non-representative, convenience samples (eg. 
undergraduate students) and were performed by untrained interviewers (eg. 
postgraduate economics students) without any quality control.  There are key areas 
where such studies can be shown to be inadequate.  Several lessons should now 
have been learnt. 
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(i) Survey design should involve easily understood and pre-tested language, 
taking onboard all feedback from focus groups not just that which is convenient; 
(ii) Data collection requires attention to sample size, collection methods, sample 
representation of the general population, and randomised selection; 
(iii) Interpreting the values obtained as market prices requires knowledge of and 
respect for the restrictions imposed by the theoretical economic model; 
(iv) Empirical analysis requires the correct statistical tests; 
(v) Reliability and validity tests need to be conducted with the presentation of 
regression results explaining bids (WTP/WTA) as a function of relevant factors; 
(vi) Where this has been done the explanatory power has often proven very low, 
but this then requires explanation and attention. 
This would seem to argue in favour of best practice guidance for economists.  
However, survey design seems to be more of an art than a science, at least beyond 
following some basic common sense as to general social science practice.  In 
addition, there seems to be some difficulty in separating out scientific requirements of 
good practice from politically motivated desires, and this applies to the still dominant 
set of guidelines i.e. those of the NOAA Panel. 
The NOAA Panel was set within a struggle between competing parties, as 
evidenced by the inclusion of two Nobel Laureates from different camps in the Exxon 
Valdez legal battle: Kenneth Arrow (Exxon consultant) and Robert Solow (State of 
Alaska consultant).  Their recommendation of “conservative” design to achieve low 
value estimates appears to be aimed at meeting civil service/political desires and 
avoiding the embarrassment of excessively large numbers overturning policies or pet 
projects and annoying lobby groups.  This conservative design argument has since 
been transferred to the UK and most prominently for a CVM survey employed to 
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support a tax on aggregates extraction (Department of the Environment Transport 
and the Regions, 1999); in this case numbers were significantly and explicitly 
reduced by survey design and the use of a 25% discount rate.  Conservative design 
seems theoretically unjustifiable (Knetsch, 1994). 
Indeed several NOAA recommendations are questionable.  The exclusive use 
of WTP formats is used to reduce the size of numbers produced and ignores the 
beliefs held about rights in society as opposed to what is legally defined (Knetsch, 
2005).  The exclusion of open-ended formats has been used to ignore results 
showing anomalies, although the alternative close-ended formats (eg. dichotomous 
choice) have increasingly recognised problems of their own.  A decade ago Willis 
(1995) noted the culturally specific context of the NOAA Panel recommendations and 
that, for example, voting on hypothecated taxes is totally outside UK experience.  
Even within the USA Hanemann (1994: 20) has admitted that “…there are few cases 
where local governments actually set environmental quality.”  This argues against the 
approach of a referendum format on taxes as being realistic and familiar to “the 
public”, although this has not prevented Hanemann advocating that approach.  
Despite, or perhaps because of, the drawbacks, the guidelines have proven popular 
with practitioners and the search for “a manual” has been emulated elsewhere eg. in 
the UK by the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (Bateman et 
al., 2002). 
The fundamental drive for those economists trying to refine the method in this 
way has been to find the Holy Grail survey which can access “true values” as 
expressed by preferences.  This encapsulates the concept of an ideal design to 
replicate a hypothetical market situation including the incentive structures.  The aim is 
to measure individual preferences on the basis that they are pre-formed.  The survey 
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instrument should then be “neutral” and any information provided merely informs 
those preferences rather than forming them. 
CVM economists have developed various concepts of “bias” which are 
believed to obscure “true values”.  The concerns have changed over time, even 
though older problems remain unresolved.  Key issues in the more recent literature 
have been for avoiding hypothetical bias, information bias, scope/scale insensitivity 
and the embedding effect, and bid elicitation under dichotomous choice formats.  
Issue given much less frequent explicit coverage include the role of ethics and 
attitudes, the formation of preferences within the survey administration process, and 
the treatment of bid item non-response.  In the remainder of this section several key 
“bias” problems are reviewed, while the next section probes into some of the less 
commonly addressed issues and links these to theories from social psychology. 
Strategic Bias 
A repeatedly referenced concern of economists is the potential for individuals to 
mislead others in order to gain some advantage for themselves.  This is termed 
strategic behaviour and free riding.  In the neoclassical economic model there are no 
social rules or norms for behaviour and the only ethical guide is individual preference 
satisfaction.  Sen pointed out the problems with such an approach some time ago 
(Sen, 1977), i.e. that such a world would soon fall apart due to the selfish interested 
parties actions, unbounded by the norms of social behaviour and institutions.  Still the 
issue of strategic behaviour is prominent as an explanation for anomalies in data. 
In CVM this usually arises where there are “outlier” bids of a very large amount 
which have a strong influence on the mean.  This should only be regarded as a 
problem when the bid is unlikely to occur because the individual lacks the income to 
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pay or would actually accept a much lower amount as compensation.  However, the 
justification of strategic bias is used to implement a simple censoring (eg. 5% 
trimming) without much attention to the actual intention of respondents making these 
bids.  The NOAA Panel “conservative” design recommendation is further used to 
support this blanket trimming approach.  Free riding is usually described as under 
bidding on the basis that the public good will be provided in any case, and this has 
then been linked to hypothetical bias (i.e. over bidding in WTP surveys and then 
reducing the bid when actual payment is requested).  The solution offered is to 
choose “incentive compatible” designs to make individuals avoid such behaviour, 
although there is also recognition that all designs have their problems and can merely 
result in different strategies of under or over bidding (Carson, Flores and Meade, 
2001). 
The preoccupation of economists with strategic behaviour seems to lack a 
good empirical basis in CVM results.  For example, an extensive review of CVM 
studies in the health care literature found no instances of strategic bias (Klose, 1999).  
Indeed reviews of CVM often make reference to strategic behaviour without citing 
any empirical case studies and merely take its existence as given; instead, they 
concentrate on the implications and alternative “incentive compatible” bid designs 
(eg., Carson, Flores and Meade, 2001; Hanley and Shogren, 2005).  The evidence 
which is sometimes offered concerns the divergence between hypothetical requests 
and actual requests which would appear to be an issue with other potential 
dimensions. 
Hypothetical Bias 
Economists typically use secondary data in their work, which makes the CVM an 
unusual foray into the world of direct contact with people.  One aspect of early and 
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persistent criticism has then been that the survey is hypothetical rather than an actual 
market and therefore cannot be trusted to produce realistic results.  Hypothetical bias 
is where individuals fail to answer as if they were in an actual market trade-off 
situation so that when they are asked for an actual payment, or given compensation, 
they reject this or their answers diverge significantly in amount. 
Typically, WTP is cited as being over estimated by CVM surveys.  However, 
the evidence appears somewhat mixed with most work being experimental and the 
relationship of this to environmental scenarios in CVM surveys then being unclear.  
There have been reviews addressing the issue.  For example, Carson et al. (1996) 
compared 83 studies involving stated versus revealed preferences and found slight 
underestimation in the CVM results compared to actual payments.  Such meta 
studies imply no generalised rule can be applied for “calibration”.  At the level of an 
aggregated bid from a given study there may be no difference between a modern 
CVM survey and actual payments with real goods, but at the individual bid level there 
can be considerable variation (see study by Bhatia and Fox-Rushby, 2003).  Recent 
experimental results corroborate this finding, and add that for individuals giving low 
bids they may underestimate their WTP while those giving high bids overestimate 
(Camacho-Cuena et al., 2004).  However, the results would seem to depend upon 
the type of “commodity” under consideration and the specific context being put 
forward.  Variations in design and circumstance make generalised results difficult to 
discern.  For example there are major differences between asking populations at risk 
from malaria their WTP for a mosquito net (eg., Bhatia and Fox-Rushby, 2003), which 
has known benefits, and asking those in urban areas their WTP for saving an 
endangered species of, say, elephant (eg., Bandara and Tisdell, 2004). 
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As mentioned above, hypothetical bias has been linked to strategic behaviour, 
but without adequately testing why people respond the way they do.  When 
interviewed after a CVM survey, there is good evidence for respondents having a 
very different understanding of what they are doing than that attributed to them by 
economists (Burgess, Clark and Harrison, 1998).  Participants challenge claims that 
the CVM is a democratic process for ensuring that public values are incorporated in 
policy decisions, and argue for a decision-making institution where local people can 
contribute to environmental policy decisions through dialogue with scientists and 
policy-makers (Clark, Burgess and Harrison, 2000).  Such evidence suggests, the 
CVM process can be viewed as a technique of 'dialogue-at-a-distance' between 
researchers and respondents which involves encoding and decoding of the 'good'.  
Incomplete specification of the environmental change, which would seem normal, 
means respondents are able to bring their own readings to their interpretation of the 
scenario so that researchers cannot know precisely what 'good' respondents were 
attempting to 'value' (Burgess, Clark and Harrison, 2000).  Respondents may also 
show: difficulties in contextualising a scenario and how much it might be worth in both 
monetary and non-monetary terms; an inability to work out a value for one scheme in 
isolation from others; and feelings that values are incommensurable, i.e., money vs. 
Nature (Clark, Burgess and Harrison, 2000). 
In order to know why people give the answer they do some probing of 
motivations would seem necessary, rather than just drawing inferences.  The 
divergence between stated and revealed preferences might then be paralleled to the 
Fishbein-Ajzen (1975) attitude behaviour model and the difference between stated 
and actual behaviour.  In this case motivations might be based upon attitudes and 
social norms.  Extending the economic research in this direction might then enable 
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better understanding of the reasons for the stated WTP prior to researching the link 
of stated to revealed WTP (Spash, 1998; 2006). 
One application in this direction does exist on the subject of hypothetical bias.  
Picking-up on the idea of Cummings and Taylor (1999), that entreaties to avoid 
regarding the CVM survey as hypothetical can remove that bias, Ajzen et al. (2004) 
have tested for motivations using the Theory of Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991).  
The predictive power of the model is improved by the entreaties.  They argue that 
norms are activated by the entreaties and that these are already operative in an 
actual payment scenario.  The scenario of WTP towards a college fund amongst 169 
students is far removed from environmental applications of the CVM, and the authors 
qualify their results against generalisation to other contexts and populations.  The use 
of entreaties in the above studies was conducted on a single bid referendum while 
when a payment range is used only those at the high end are affected (Brown, Ajzen 
and Hrubes, 2003; Murphy, Stevens and Weatherhead, 2005).  In contrast Aadland 
and Caplan (2003) find a short entreaty exacerbates the bias.  Overall the role of 
these entreaties and whether they are a form of persuasion to get conformity to the 
economists’ prior expectation remains rather unclear.  However, this move seems to 
reinforce the need for motivational research and collaboration with social 
psychologists and others. 
WTP Versus WTA 
A persistent difference has been found between WTP and WTA with the latter 
typically four to five times greater than the former.  This was noted early on in the 
development of the technique and was a major concern (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; 
Thayer, 1981).  Empirical studies since then, including those involving actual goods 
in experimental situations, have found people systematically value losses, measured 
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by WTA, two to four times more than otherwise commensurate gains, measured by 
WTP (Knetsch, 2005: 96). Attempts at explaining the difference within a neoclassical 
economic framework have included income effects, strategic behaviour and goods 
having imperfect substitutes (Hanemann, 1991; Shogren et al., 1994).  However, 
these fail to account for the large and consistent variations in CVM surveys, and 
generally cannot explain divergence where the conditions required by standard 
theoretical explanations are violated (Knetsch, 2005). 
An alternative explanation is the psychological impact of “ownership” of a good 
actually changing the demand function and indeed causing it to become kinked.  This 
has been termed by economists an “endowment effect” (Knetsch and Sinden, 1984; 
Thaler, 1980), with the associated psychological explanation being loss aversion 
(Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler, 1991) termed “prospect theory” (Kahneman and 
Tversky, 1979).  Experimental results show the large differences between people's 
valuations of gains and losses, and are inconsistent with the axioms of completeness, 
transitivity, and dominance.  That is, economic analyses and predictions of consumer 
behaviour are largely based on theories inconsistent with actual choices (Knetsch, 
1995).  The repeatedly found differences in the valuation placed on goods and 
money, depending on whether entitlements are being acquired or given up, provide 
direct evidence of preference assumption violations. 
In this light the NOAA Panel recommendation of only using WTP formats takes 
on a different form.  In effect a troublesome aspect of behavioural findings has been 
largely excluded by the CVM community from further consideration.  Indeed the 
argument has been put forward that WTP is less problematic, preferred by business, 
causes less protesting and, therefore, can be substituted for WTA (Hanley and 
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Shogren, 2005).  Recent US EPA (2000) guidelines perpetuate this substitution 
mistake (see critical review by Knetsch, 2005). 
As Knetsch has noted the choice of welfare measure depends upon the 
reference state which people associate with a given environmental change (Knetsch, 
1994), and their feeling of psychological ownership rather than legal entitlements 
(Knetsch, 2005).  Property rights may be contested so that the general public, as in 
the case of environmental damages, must assert their position, but in CVM these 
decisions are made behind closed doors.  Hanley and Shogren (2005: 16-17) seem 
to regard a UK policy case where WTA was thrown out for WTP as a success, 
although the process they describe involved a complaint by the industrial polluter 
against the WTA study, the Government commissioning a new study, and the newly 
commissioned experts adopting WTP and producing far smaller damage estimates.  
Some might question the credibility of such a process let alone its standing as 
scientific analysis. 
In the expert discussions of design for the same study, Hanemann argued that 
people are unfamiliar with the WTA format.  This idea is strange in light of the fact 
that every payment by a purchasing agent is matched by an acceptance of monetary 
compensation on the part of the selling agent.  So every market transaction involves 
a WTA and a WTP simultaneously.  Some studies have even explored this (Amigues 
et al., 2002; MacMillan, Duff and Elston, 2001), with one scenario showing WTA to 
achieve environmental change can be more familiar to a given group (eg. farmers) 
than WTP is for another (eg. the public) (Bateman et al., 1996). 
The importance of context within which exchange occurs should then be noted.  
For example, there is no reason to expect WTP to diverge from WTA under the loss 
aversion theory if there is no aversion to loss eg. when the person accepting payment 
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is in the business of selling and that is indeed their goal.  This unfortunately leads 
some to the tortuous tautological argument that if only people were educated in the 
ways of the market and given the right incentives (carrots and sticks) then they would 
conform and produce the required results consistent with market theory (List, 2003); 
after all “…evidence exists suggesting that people can learn to act rationally” (Hanley 
and Shogren, 2005: 29).  The language used in these justifications also has 
unfortunate connotations with the problem apparently being that behaviour goes 
“unpunished by market discipline” (Shogren and Hayes, 1997: 243).  The theory 
requires people to behave in a certain way and they can be made to do so; this ability 
to reify economic theory is then meant to be comforting. 
Before leaving the topic I will note two other related issues.  First, Knetsch 
(2005) notes that behavioural findings show people value future losses more than 
future gains which implies different discount rates.  Others have found negative 
discount rates for gains (see Lowenstein, 1987; Lowenstein and Prelec, 1991), and 
other behaviour inconsistent with economists’ claims (Lowenstein and Prelec, 1992).  
Second, economists ignore the moral considerations which people take into account 
when considering environmental damages.  This is important for understanding 
intergenerational issues (Spash, 2002b), and has also been related to the WTP-WTA 
divergence under environmental scenarios with motivations including feelings of 
responsibility for harm, dissociation of entities or changes from the market place and 
trade-offs, and the activation of social norms (see the review by Brown and Gregory, 
1999). 
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Information Bias 
In environmental valuation, information has largely been discussed in terms of 
whether providing more information on an issue is likely to increase WTP.  The 
assumption is that objective information relevant to the valuation of an entity can be 
provided by the interviewer in different quantities.  Due to the sensitivity of responses 
to the information supplied the pre-testing of the survey, and more recently focus 
groups, have become of increasing importance.  The NOAA Panel recommended 
CVM aim for a level of information provision “…at least as high as that which the 
average voter brings to a real referendum on the provision of a specific public 
good,…”, and make use of ‘follow-up questions’ on understanding (Arrow et al., 1993: 
4607).  Their guidelines recommend that: “Adequate information must be provided to 
respondents about the environmental program that is offered. It must be defined in a 
way that is relevant to damage assessment” (Arrow et al., 1993).  However, the 
meaning of being ‘adequately’ informed with ‘relevant’ information is vague and the 
methods by which individuals assimilate and process information unexplained.  
Those economists trying to understand human valuation of environmental entities 
need to know how individuals form their preferences, the key factors which change 
preferences and their stability. 
Acceptance that any presentation of information must be moulded and 
environmental issues explained within a given frame means the information issue is 
often conceptualised in terms of a ‘framing’ problem (eg. Boyle, 1989).  A separation 
is then attempted between the substance of information (objective data) and the way 
in which information is supplied or questions asked (framing).  Changes in the former 
are expected to impact perceptions and valuations while if the latter do so this is 
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regarded as a bias.  Objective data is meant to describe the ‘commodity’ to be valued 
while the framing is merely the method of obtaining a WTP or WTA measure. 
Only if an actual environmental change can be defined ‘objectively’ can the 
aim of bringing all individuals to a common understanding of that change have a 
certain logic.  This may be questionable even for a common market commodity (eg. a 
house).  Certainly a set of physical attributes might be defined.  Yet, there are often 
disagreements between different individuals over the condition of the commodity (eg. 
the property with “much potential”) and definition of attributes (eg. is a small room a 
single bedroom or a store room?).  A divergence between actual and perceived 
conditions then becomes harder to define and reliance falls upon subjective 
perception.  The problem is compounded for complex environmental issues.  The 
situation is one where “…the CVM practitioner has no practical anchor for accuracy” 
and “…must then rely upon individual perceptions of environmental change-related 
effects…”, which means “…variations across individuals of CVM values may reflect 
differences in perceptions of the hypothesized commodity” (Cummings, Brookshire 
and Schulze, 1986: 57-58). 
In addition, disagreement has existed over what exactly constitutes a framing 
problem as opposed to defining attributes of the ‘commodity’.  In particular, 
unresolved issues surround whether the payment mechanism (eg. income tax, trust 
fund) or institutional arrangements (government, charity) are to be included as 
framing issues.  The difference in treatment means such factors are either a cause of 
bias to be avoided or individuals should be regarded as valuing ‘different’ 
commodities constituted of various attributes which are then widely defined.  The bias 
position implies qualification of the results as an under or over estimate of some ‘true’ 
value, while the commodity change position limits any generalisation of values 
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outside the specific context described making every CVM result specific to a unique 
“commodity” (Spash, 2002a). 
One thing seems clear, the role of the analyst or survey design team remains 
central to bounding the information set.  Which issues need to be presented, in what 
format and detail are matters where differences of opinion will result and the outcome 
can be expected to influence people’s perception of the valuation question.  However, 
the analyst may conceive of information and its interpretation by respondents in one 
way, while respondents interpret that same information in unexpected ways as far as 
the analyst is concerned, i.e. what Burgess, Clark and Harrison (2000) term encoding 
and decoding.  One aspect of this divergence in understanding arises because 
environmental issues concern value conflicts.  These may, for example, relate to 
fundamental disagreements over the role of markets and how environmental issues 
should be addressed.  Environmentalists might then be expected to see concerns of 
justice and rights as central aspects while economists always look for the implicit 
trade-off.  The former may reject the very commensurability which the latter take as 
given and design into their surveys. 
The information presented about an environmental good or service has been 
connected to the motive to process information (Ajzen, Brown and Rosenthal, 1996).  
This motive is determined by an individual’s ability to understand the issue and their 
perception of the personal relevance of the issue to them.  If their motivation is high 
then they enter central processing mode and scrutinise and evaluate information with 
regard to the substance of the argument.  This allows WTP to be increased by 
favourable reporting of the benefits.  Alternatively, a low motivation means peripheral 
processing mode is entered and moods and subtle cues become determining factors 
in responses.  This leads to the argument that the WTP for a public good is affected 
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more by stimulating a moral perspective when individuals are in peripheral 
processing mode (Ajzen, Brown and Rosenthal, 1996). 
Spash (2002a) offers a different model for the role of ethical beliefs.  In an 
environmental CVM survey any concerns which an individual holds as ethical beliefs, 
such as utilitarianism or rights, might come into play directly.  That is, rather than 
being ‘peripheral’ to the description of environmental changes these are likely to be 
key issues.  Along with environmental attitudes and social norms, such ethical beliefs 
would feed into the reasoning over whether to make a monetary trade-off.  The 
empirical results presented by Spash (2002a) show that the same information 
influences individuals differently so that some individuals find they are being informed 
while others feel their preferences are being formed, during an identical CVM 
exercise.  This impact on the formation of preferences during a CVM survey 
influences the bid.  Thus the idea of a neutral or objective set of data on an 
environmental change is challenged and the meaning of information bias brought into 
question.  In addition, rather than finding fundamental ethical beliefs to be peripheral 
matters which can be cued to distort valuation processes, such beliefs are found to 
be key determinants of the values expressed.  While ethical beliefs are strongly 
related to the way in which information is processed the evidence counters the 
proposal of Ajzen et al. (1996), and instead supports a model where those in central 
processing mode call upon ethical positions to value environmental changes. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The CVM has proven a controversial technique of environmental valuation, but rather 
than dismiss the extensive primary data collected this paper suggests economists 
learn from the empirical evidence.  Attempts to remove all “anomalies” via survey 
design have proven flawed.  Certainly some aspects of early work were poor in terms 
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of social science research approaches and there is still room for improvement, but 
many results cannot be explained away on that account and many have been 
corroborated via experimental evidence.  Design of a perfect single survey to reveal 
true preferences is a misguided ideal.  Worse is the attempt to force behavioural 
conformity to the expectations of the economic analyst to achieve “market discipline”.  
Indeed anomalies show the richness and variety of human motivation and behaviour 
and as a result the need for learning across disciplines. 
One problem with the approach of searching for the perfect survey instrument 
and set of guidelines is how this then restricts future research.  CVM surveys are 
conducted for different reasons with different requirements.  These are mainly as 
follows:  
(i) as research exercises, including work by students to get degree qualifications; 
(ii) as theoretical and experimental research tools by academics; 
(iii) as aids to project appraisal; 
(iv) evidence in litigation for damages, apparently solely in the USA 
(v) as part of public policy debates, including advocacy by vested interest groups 
and government agencies. 
The failure of the CVM community is to recognise these different roles and their 
different requirements and institutional contexts.  This is particularly important in light 
of a decade of dominant reference to the NOAA Panel guidelines as the ultimate 
authority on how to conduct a valid CVM survey. 
Turning to motivation means paying attention to the work done in social 
psychology.  Studies have started being conducted using measures of pro-social 
choice and other theories.  These indicate the importance of attitudes in 
understanding WTP.  However, they also show attitudes and stated WTP are far from 
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identical.  Indeed social norms and perceived behavioural control both appear 
relevant, although results for environmental change are mixed across the few existing 
studies.  Ethical positions are also found to be consistently important. 
The evidence supporting the role of ethical positions in explaining WTP is 
growing in the area of environmental valuation.  Such a relationship may not 
generalise outside environmental behaviours.  However, in this context, the 
divergence between beliefs in rights and consequentialism appears fundamental to 
understanding stated bids under the CVM. 
Overall the CVM can be seen as a means of expanding the economists’ 
conception of human psychology and behaviour.  Philosophical concepts such as 
incommensurability and rights, of which economists tend to be either ignorant or 
scornful, cannot be dismissed.  The empirical evidence is showing the importance of 
understanding the motives for human behaviour and the existence of plural values in 
society. 
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